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Book Review
The Premature Burial of
the Irreparable Injury Rule
THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE. By Douglas
Laycock.t New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Pp. xiii; 356. $37.00.$
Reviewed by Gene R. Shreve*
The considerable merits of Douglas Laycock's new book will not
surprise readers. Before it appeared, the author had already become
America's leading authority on injunctions.' The work is lucid, forceful,
and erudite. At times, the author's imagination in reconceptualizing
injunctions invites comparisons to the great Henry McClintock.2 Best of
all, perhaps, this book is certain to stimulate a good deal of thought on
remedies and to rekindle useful discussion about the proper role of
injunctions.
Yet the enthusiasm of many for The Death of the Irreparable Injury
Rule may exceed mine.3 I am troubled by the premise that opens the book
t Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law, The University of Texas School of Law. B.A.
1970, Michigan State University; J.D. 1973, The University of Chicago.
* Hereinafter cited by page number only.
* Professor, School of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. B.A. 1965, University of
Oklahoma; LL.B 1968, LL.M. 1975 Harvard Law School. Support for this piece came from a summer
grant provided by Indiana University and the School of Law. For their helpful comments on the draft,
I am grateful to Doug Rendleman, Lauren Robel, and David Schoenbrod. My thanks to Joyce
Saltalamachia for providing me with a place to work and write at New York Law School.
1. This book adds to a truly impressive bibliography in the remedies field, including DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMmcECN REmmEs-CAsEs AND MATERIALS (1st ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991);
Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HAR.V. L. REV. 688 (1990); Douglas
Laycock, The Remedies Issues: Compensatory Damages, Specific Performance, Punitive Damages,
Supersedeas Bonds, and Abstention, 9 REv. LITIG. 473 (1990); Douglas Laycock, Injunctions and the
Irreparable Injury Rule, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 1065 (1979); Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with
State Prosecutions: The Cases DombrowskiForgot, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. 636 (1979); Douglas Laycock,
Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 S. CT. REV. 193.
2. See, e.g., Henry L. McClintock, Adequacy oflneffective Remedy at Law, 16 MINN. L. REv.
233 (1932). This is not to say that their views are the same. McClintock sought to recast rather than
to reject the irreparable injury rule. See id. at 254-55 (arguing that the question of adequacy of a
remedy at law should be based on practical instead of theoretical grounds).
3. Praise appearing on the dust jacket of the book includes: "I was reminded of Cardozo, of
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and provides its title. The idea that the irreparable injury rule is dead is
not entirely plausible. Nor is that premise in itself particularly interesting.
However, one of the accomplishments of this book is the manner in which
it survives those problems. In spite of a weak opening premise, this is a
welcome and important work.
The irreparable injury rule blocks an injunction when the harm that the
injunction would have averted is compensable.4 Whether stated this way,
or that one seeking an injunction must have no adequate remedy at law,5
the rule assigns injunctions an inferior place within a remedial hierarchy
by making them more difficult to obtain than damages. Laycock correctly
observes that courts invoke the irreparable injury rule to prevent a plaintiff
from realizing his preference for an injunctive remedy.6 Of course, the
rule is but one of many capable of frustrating a plaintiff in this way.7
Important questions emerge regarding whether or how the hierarchy held
in place by these rules should exist. I only wish that the author had spent
more time on those questions and less on his avowed purpose of proving
the demise of the irreparable injury rule.
Laycock's argument here is not easy to follow. Legal concepts have
no measurable heartbeat, and life-death metaphors describing them risk a
certain imprecision! Worse, to the extent this imagery does fit, it seems
to point away from the author's conclusion that the irreparable injury rule
is dead. As Laycock jousts with the rule throughout much of the book and
in numerous contemporary settings, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the rule is in robust (if undeserved) good health. Numerous cases
cited in the book suggest that the rule is alive in the minds of judges.
Chafee, and even of Maitland in the power Laycock seemed to have over the ideas and in the sweep
of materials he was able to bring to bear." (Dan B. Dobbs, Professor of Law, Univ. of Arizona School
of Law); "A great service to the law-first rate Grand Style stuff." (Ian R. MacNeil, Professor of Law,
Northwestern Univ. Law School); and "Breathtaking-and utterly convincing." (Elizabeth Warren,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Pennsylvania School of Law). Others have joined these distinguished
readers in lauding the work. Recently, it received the Scribes Book Award. See Bruce Vincent, In
the News: Honors, TEX. LAW., Aug. 19, 1991, at 27.
4. As Laycockputs it, "[ilnjury is irreparable if plaintiff cannotuse damages to replace the specific
thing he has lost." P. 37.
5. I have tried to demonstrate why, "similar as the tests are, they do not express quite the same
idea." Gene R. Shreve, FederalInjunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 382, 393
(1983). For the sake of the reader, however, I will follow Laycock's convention and "use the two
formulations interchangeably." P. 9.
6. Pp. 5-6.
7. Other rules are discussed in WILLIAM Q. DE FUNLAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY, §§ 24,
98 (2d ed. 1956); PETER C. HOFFER, THE LAw's CONsCHINcE: EuTABLE CONsTrUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA 10-11 (1990); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL.
L. REV. 524 (1982); David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace
Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627 (1988); Shreve, supra note
5. Laycock notes some himself. See pp. 265-76 (proposing a Tentative Restatement); infra notes 42-
45 and accompanying text (describing Laycock's attempts to propose a Tentative Restatement).
8. On death as a means of comprehending or defining law, see JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL
IMAGINATION 83-187 (1973).
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Additional federal and state decisions9 and the impressions of many
commentators ° support the same conclusion.
Of course, Professor Laycock is not suggesting that the irreparable
injury rule has disappeared. He is attempting to use death imagery in a
different way. The irreparable injury rule is dead to Laycock because he
finds it misleading,' feels there are better rules to explain what courts
9. A spot check of federal cases not cited in the book reveals one case that invoked the rule to
refuse a final injunction. See Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 1990). Many others have
discussed the rule with reference to questions of preliminary relief. See, e.g., United States v. Rural
Elec. Convenience Coop. Co., 922 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1991) (agreeing "with the district court that
if the United States were able to intervene in the state court proceeding, it would have an adequate
remedy at law that precludes the award of [preliminary] equitable relief" (emphasis in original)); Instant
Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 800-03 (3d Cir. 1989) (upholding the district
court's denial of plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction because the plaintiff had an adequate
remedy in damages for breach of contract); Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 566, 575-76 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(discussing the broad discretion of district courts in evaluating irreparability in the context of "interim
injunctive relief").
State cases discussing the rule with reference to permanent injunctions include Eberle v. State,
779 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. Lockard, 467 N.W.2d 53,
54 (Neb. 1991); Abboudv. Lakeview, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 442,449 (Neb. 1991); AshevilleMall v. Sam
Wyche Sports World, 387 S.E.2d 70, 71 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Bradlees Tidewater, Inc. v. Walnut
Hill Inv., Inc., 391 S.E.2d 304, 306-08 (Va. 1990); Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 387 S.E.2d 783,
786 (Va. 1990). State decisions discuss the rule also with reference to preliminary relief. See, e.g.,
Galle v. Coile, 556 So.2d 957 (La. Ct. App. 1990). Unlike the picture concerning federal cases,
however, preliminary relief cases do not clearly predominatethe discussion in state courts. This may
be because, overall, interests secured through the exercise of federal jurisdiction are more perishable
in the short term.
10. Many who have criticized aspects of the irreparable injury rule appear to have assumed that
the rule is very much alive. See, e.g., OwEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 38-39 (1978)
(claiming that the general effect of the irreparable injury rule is to create a remedial hierarchy and to
relegate the injunction to a subordinate place in that hierarchy); R. Grant Hammond, Interlocutory
Injunctions: T"unefor a New Model?, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 240, 276 (1980) ("The historical constraint
[of the adequacy test] is now grossly overstated and is one of the contemporary shibboleths of the
law."); John Leubsdorf, The Standardfor Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 526, 544-
45 (1978) (noting that irreparable injury is not mentioned in all preliminary injunction cases, and
nevertheless incorporating it into his model for a balancing approach to injunctive decisions);
McClintock, supra note 2, at 233 (assuming, at the start of his discussion, that courts consider the
adequacy of the remedy at law in determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate); Doug
Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisitefor an Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 346,
346 (1981) (noting that for "the past century and a half" courts have required a showing of irreparable
injury for injunctive relief); Shreve, supra note 5, at 387 (agreeing with critics of the irreparable injury
rule that the "irreparability-adequacy requirement" relegates the injunction to "an inferior hierarchical
position in the law of remedies"); Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Transformed: Preliminary Injunctions
to Require the Payment of Money, 70 B.U. L. REV. 623, 668 (1990) (explaining that courts hesitate
to grant equitable remedies when legal remedies would be adequate so as not to deprive litigants of the
opportunity to present their claims to a jury).
11. Pp. 4-7, 104 .
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do," believes diverse applications have distorted its meaning, 3 and finds
it to have little useful function.' Thus, even though "courts talk about
irreparable injury all the time,""5 the irreparable injury rule seems dead
to Professor Laycock because it does not contribute to the kind of dynamic
decision making he desires for injunction cases.' 6
A good example of what Professor Laycock seems to be driving at
occurs when he discusses an important exception to his thesis: that the rule
is "very much alive at the stage of preliminary relief."1 7 He makes this
exception less because so many preliminary relief decisions raise the
rule'8 than because the irreparable injury rule makes sense to him in this
setting. 9 The rule "has teeth at the preliminary injunction stage because
it does serve a purpose there."' On the other hand, the author writes
that "[t]he irreparable injury rule has largely died at the permanent
injunction stage because it serves no purpose there. "2
Clearly, it is not enough for Professor Laycock simply to criticize the
rule. "I do not argue merely that the irreparable injury rule should be
abandoned," he writes. "I argue that it has been abandoned in all but
rhetoric."' To make this leap, however, the author comes perilously
close to an "alive if you like it, dead if you don't" approach to legal
criticism. It strains the intelligible limits of a life-death metaphor to
declare that a rule is dead merely because it is deficient in explanatory
power, or because it can lead to bad results. The longevity of a rule is not
affected to that degree by its popularity with commentators. Thus, while
we can probably agree that the rule of Swift v. Tyson'-like it or
12. See pp. 105 (describing court opinions in which the irreparable injury rule was invoked despite
the fact that the decision could be better explained as a balancing of "the cost to defendant or the court
from a fully adequate remedy against the cost to plaintiff of a less than adequate remedy"); pp. 193-201
(reviewing cases in which the courts have used the irreparable injury rule to deny relief to the plaintiffs
while actually deciding the case on its substantive merits).
13. See pp. 8-9, 241.
14. See pp. 100-04.
15. Pp. 22-23.
16. Professor Laycock never seems to suggest how the rule was ever more alive in this, his sense
than it is now. On the difficulties this omission presents for an argument based on life-death imagery,
see infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
17. P. 111.
18. P. 110. Laycock writes: "Far and away the most common occasions for irreparable injury
opinions are motions for preliminary relief: temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions,
receivers, and the like." P. 110 (citations omitted). He sets these situations apart from those where
the question is whether to grant permanent (final) injunctive relief. The author regards the irreparable
injury rule as alive for preliminary relief decisions, observing that it "can actually do some good"
there. Id. By Laycock's own account then, his position that the irreparable injury rule is dead fits only
a minority of cases in which courts discuss the rule. To avoid a certain amount of confusion, Laycock
might have narrowed his title ahd thesis to something like The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule in
Permanent Injunction Cases.
19. See pp. 111-17.
20. P. 117.
21. Id.
22. P. 7 (emphasis in original).
23. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Swift authorized federal judges sitting in diversity to make and
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not--is dead,' it is very hard to see the irreparable injury rule as dead
in any natural or useful sense of the term.
These difficulties at the "death" end of Laycock's life-death metaphor
are enough to make his argument misfire; however, there are difficulties
on the "life" end as well. The death of the irreparable injury rule
assumes a dramatically altered state. That is, a rule cannot be dead unless
it was once in some different, vital sense alive. A "death-of" approach to
legal argument must contemplate the legal rule or principle when it was
alive. This discussion need not be complementary, but it should at least
acknowledge and describe how the principle exerted influence at an earlier
time.' Readers badly need that earlier picture of the irreparable injury
rule, but the book does not deliver it. Rather, the rule applied to
permanent injunctions seems in the author's view never to have been much
closer to satisfying his standard for a living rule27 than it is now. From
Laycock's perspective, it is almost as though the rule were stillborn.'
administer rules of decision (called federal general common law) displacing state common law. See
id. at 18-19.
24. Swift has always had its defenders. See, e.g., John Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41
AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992); Arthur 1. Keefe et al., Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494
(1949). But for some time now, most commentators have opposed Swift on the ground that the Rules
Enabling Act (and perhaps the Constitution) prevents federal courts from disregarding state substantive
law upon "no greater claim to authority than that their diversity jurisdiction has been invoked." Gene
R. Shreve, From Swift to Erie: An Historical Perspective, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 869, 870-71 (1984). See
generally TONY FREmYE, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE Swn;T & ERE CASES IN AMERICAN
FEDERALISM (1981) (examining the changing nature of the federal judiciary's authority over state law
in disputes involving private rights).
25. Swift was overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Writing for the Court,
Justice Brandeis stated: "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.... There is no federal general
common law." Id. at 78.
26. For example, death-of-contract theorists, while typically not enamored of traditional contract
principles, have contrasted periods when they exerted influence in certain business spheres with later
periods when the same contract law principles were supplanted. The death-of-contract idea, noted in
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974), is developed in Lawrence M. Friedman &
Stewart Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present, and Future, 1967 Wisc. L.
REv. 805, 812-13.
27. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
28. The only justification for the rule in the permanent-injunction setting possibly to be found in
the book is the author's brief account of the use of the rule in political wars between law and equity
courts. See pp. 19-20. If that battle was necessary to keep the rule alive, it has been dead for a long
time.
The rule was created to allocate jurisdiction between courts that have long been
merged.... Even before the merger, Americans had largely eliminated the differences
between law judges and equity judges. Law and equity were committed to the same
federal judges from the beginning-the irreparable injury rule never served its original
purpose even for a day in federal court.
P. 281.
Laycock's choice of historical investigation as a means of getting to the bottom of matters is
sound. His observations (similar to those in Wasserman, supra note 10, at 652-54) are helpful as far
as they go. But I think his preoccupation with turf battles between English law and chancery courts
offers too narrow a conception of the life and purpose of the irreparable injury rule. Indeed, the
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The heart of the matter eventually becomes clear. The irreparable
injury rule is not really dead. Professor Laycock is just dead against it.
I think that readers will derive more enjoyment and profit from his book
if they note this distinction and do not take too seriously the author's
insistence on the rule's demise. Laycock the advocate is more interesting
than Laycock the medical examiner. Most interesting of all is the Laycock
who discards advocacy in favor of dialogue. The best examples of this
dialogue occur when the author approaches larger matters of procedural
jurisprudence. Laycock appreciates that, when injunctions are viewed in
this dimension, the forces at work are larger than those represented by the
policies of any single substantive field, or the political interests of any one
group. In short, Laycock appreciates the value of a trans-substantive
perspective.
The trend until recently has been to view procedure by examining its
effects on particular substantive interests29 or on particular groups.'
There has been a corresponding antagonism toward trans-substantive
irreparable injury rule evolved with a number of other maxims to enhance the stature and quality of
equitable relief. I have maintained elsewhere that
[e]quity evolved to a large extent as a natural law reaction against legal formalism....
However, among the problems encountered by equity were difficulties of legal
justification, precisely becauseits decisionswere less a result of the rule-boundceremony.
Natural law justifications for equitable power failed to suggest a stopping point....
It remains true that authority for issuing injunctions is largely shaped by
admonitions (reasons why injunctions should be refused).
GeneR. Shreve, Pragmatism Without Politics-A Half Measure ofAuthorityforJurisdictional Common
Law, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 803-04; see also HoFFER, supra note 7, at 8-15 (discussing the
development of the concept of a court of equity that exists to offer a remedy where the generality of
the law does injustice).
29. See, e.g., Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil
Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2179, 2183 (1989) (arguing a correlation between the emergence of a
substantivebias in procedure against civil rights claims and the development of a school of thought that
elevates ideals of efficiency above others); A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the
Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1594-95 (1991) (noting special procedural needs in
asbestos cases); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 433, 447-51 (1986) (asserting that lower courts most often insist on
fact pleading in securities fraud, civil rights, and conspiracy cases); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated
in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105, 106 (1991) (assessing Federal Riule 11 and its application
in federal courts by its effect on civil rights plaintiffs); Steve Baughman, Note, Class Actions in the
Asbestos Context: Balancing the Due Process Considerations Implicated by the Right to Opt Out, 70
TEXAS L. REv. 211,232-41 (1991) (recommendingprocedural innovations to protect the due process
rights of opt-in class action plaintiffs in asbestos litigation).
30. Note, for example, the discussion of the relationship between civil procedure and feminist
jurisprudence in Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial
Courts, 24 GA. L. REv. 909, 953-55 (1990); Elizabeth N. Schneider, Rethinking the Teaching of Civil
Procedure, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 41, 45 n.14 (1987); and Panel Discussion, Feminist Procedure, Section
on Procedure of the Association of American Law Schools Conference, San Antonio, Texas (Jan. 5,
1992); f. Martha Minow, Some Thoughts on Dispute Resolution and Civil Procedure, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 284, 293-95 (1984) (suggesting that one approach to incorporating alternative dispute resolution
into the traditional civil procedure class is to teach the compatibility of competing attitudes about civil
procedure).
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attempts to describe and value procedure.3 1  Remedies literature seems to
reflect this pattern. Thus, a good deal of remedies literature (often in the
law and economics tradition) focuses on the policies of a particular
substantive field. 32 A good deal more focuses on the interests of particu-
lar (often disadvantaged) groups. 33  But, as for procedure generally,3 4
there is also a trans-substantive tradition in remedies literature. Among
others, David Schoenbrod, 31 John Leubsdorf, 36 and Doug Rendleman3 7
have contributed to a trans-substantive understanding of remedies. And
Laycock's book may signal an important new phase of the movement.
31. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 10, at 55-56, 94; Stephen B. Burbank, OfRules and Discretion:
The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 693 (1988);
Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1465, 1473-76 (1987); Marc
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 95, 149-51 (1974-75); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270,336-37,344-45 (1989); see also David L. Shapiro, FederalRule
16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1976 n.21 (1989)
(citing numerous commentators who have questioned the "wisdom and desirability of trans-substantive
rules").
32. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Reconsidering Efficient Tort Rules for Personal njury: The Case
of Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41 (1990); Robert Cooter & Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1432 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985); Jason S.
Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of ContractDefault Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615
(1990); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Detrebling Versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the
Theory of Enforcement, 74 GEO. LJ. 1231 (1986); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific
Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984).
33. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 10; Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual
and Structural Remedies for Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1659
(1991); Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1102 (1977); Steven J. Schwartz, Damage Actions
as a Strategy for Enhancing the Quality of Care of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 17 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 651 (1989-90); Geri J. Yonover, Fighting Fire with Fire: Civil RICO and Anti-
Abortion Activists, 12 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 153 (1990).
34. For writing more sympathetic to trans-substantive approaches, see Gene R. Shreve, Eighteen
Feet of Clay: Thoughts on Phantom Rule 4(m), 67 IND. L.J. 85, 92 (1991); Shreve, supra note 28, at
791-97; Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of ManifestIy UnfoundedAssertions: An Exorcism
of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2067-68
(1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237,2244(1989); ScottM. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public
Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First Amendment, 66 TEXAs L. REV. 215,224-25 (1987).
My own conception of trans-substantive procedure is grounded in policies of judicial
administration. These policies shape trans-substantive procedure because they "strive for the most
sensitive and widespread validation of substantive law in the lives of litigants and the public, whatever
substantive law might be." Shreve, supra note 28, at 790 (emphasis in original).
35. See DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (1990); Schoenbrod,supra
note 7. Of all remedies scholars, Professor Schoenbrod has made the most explicit use of trans-
substantive concepts. He and his co-editors introduce their new book by stating that "our focus is
trans-substantive." Id. at 3. Their splendid casebook stands as one of the most important recent
developments in the remedies field.
36. See Leubsdorf, supra note 10.
37. See Rendleman, supra note 10.
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Professor Laycock sets out to explore "a wide range of cases.""
Much later, he offers in the form of a "Tentative Restatement" a "set of
functional rules for choosing among remedies." 39 The author signals the
trans-substantive character of his rules by stating that they address matters
that "arise in all areas of substantive law."' In a refreshing departure
from his earlier, more argumentative tone, the author muses: "Some of
these rules would obviously benefit from further specification, and there
may be other constraints on plaintiff's choice of remedy that I have not yet
identified. " 4 1
True enough. Yet, if Laycock only begins a new chapter of trans-
substantive inquiry, it is a splendid beginning. Here are three rules that
give the flavor of his approach:
§ 2 Undue Hardship
A court should deny permanent specific relief if:
(a) the relief would impose hardship on defendant, and
(b) that hardship is substantially disproportionate to the disad-
vantage to plaintiff of receiving only substitutionary relief.
In balancing the interests, a court should consider the relative
fault of each litigant.42
§ 3 Burden on Innocent Third Parties
A court should deny permanent specific relief if:
(a) the relief would harm innocent third parties, and
(b) that harm is not outweighed by the disadvantage to
plaintiff of receiving only substitutionary relief.
In balancing the interests, a court should consider the innocence
of the third parties and the relative entitlements of the plaintiff and
the third parties.43
§ 4 Impracticality
A court should deny permanent specific relief if:
38. P. 11.
39. P. 265.
40. Id. Continuing in this vein, Laycock writes, "I am not trying to state particular remedies for
particular wrongs .... " Id.
41. P. 266.
42. P. 268. The terms "specific relief" and "substitutionary relief" are defined earlier in the book:
With substitutionary remedies, plaintiff suffers harm and receives a sum of money.
Specific remedies seek to avoid this exchange. They aspire to prevent harm, or undo it,
rather than let it happen and compensate for it.... Substitutionary remedies include
compensatory damages, attorneys' fees, restitution of the money value of defendant's
gain, and punitive damages. Specific remedies include injunctions, specific performance
of contracts, restitution of specific property, and restitution of a specific sum of money.
P. 13. Laycock's reconcepualization of these matters is interesting and persuasive. The distinction
between specific and substitutionary relief often corresponds to what we are accustomed to think of as
the distinction between equitable and legal remedies-but, argues the author, not always. See pp. 11-
14.
43. P. 268.
1070 [Vol. 70:1063
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(a) the relief would be impractical to implement or burden-
some for the court to supervise, and
(b) these problems outweigh the disadvantage to plaintiff of
receiving only substitutionary relief. 4
Not all of Professor Laycock's rules are as broad-spectrum as
these;45 still, his Tentative Restatement serves the overall goals of judicial
administration.4 In this sense, and in the sense of promoting more
intelligible judicial decisions, Laycock's rules seem firmly in the spirit of
the new pragmatist jurisprudence.47
These rules complete Laycock's main achievement. They also
demonstrate the book's split personality, for they depend very little on a
rejection of the irreparable injury rule. Laycock avoids mention of
irreparable injury in his Tentative Restatement. Yet, he acknowledges the
need for other rules that condition the availability of injunctions just as
surely as does the irreparable injury rule.A And he presents (without
naming it as such) something close to an irreparable injury rule for
preliminary relief cases.4 9 These concessions seem entirely correct to me,
yet they represent part of an undertaking very different from the assault on
the irreparable injury rule with which Laycock begins the book.
My point is not that Professor Laycock has been too hard on the
irreparable injury rule. His view, that the plaintiff should be the judge of
44. P. 269.
45. See, e.g., p. 2 6 9 (§ 5 Personal Service Contracts) (setting forth a rule prohibiting courts from
requiring specific performance of personal services contracts); p. 270 (§ 6 Prior Restraints on Speech)
(setting forth a rule that "courts should refuse specific relief that would impose an unconstitutionalprior
restraint on speech').
46. On the bond between policies of judicial administration and trans-substantive procedure, see
supra note 34.
47. My view of pragmatism is that it can serve as a powerful clarifying and mediating agent in
procedural theory. I have endeavored elsewhere to explain how it provides a jurisprudence for trans-
substantive concerns of judicial administration. See Shreve, supra note 28, at 791-96. I have also
explored how pragmatist legal theory underpins the objective of coherentjudicial decision making. See
Gene R. Shreve, Symmetries of Access in Civil Rights Litigation: Politics, Pragmatism and Vill, 66
IND. L. 1, 38-39, 48-49 (1990).
For readers wishing a general introduction to the subject, a sketch of pragmatism as an American
philosophical movement and of the meaning and frailties of pragmatism as legal theory appears in id.
at 26-37. In addition, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454-69
(1990); ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982); Sotiros A.
Barber, Stanley Fish and the Future of Pragmatism in Legal Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1033 (1991);
Thomas C. Grey, Holmes andLegal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787 (1989); DennisM. Patterson,
Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937 (1990); Steven D. Smith, The
Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YAI L.J. 409 (1990); John Stick, Can Nhilism Be Pragmatic?, 100
HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986); Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990).
48. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
49. Section 13 of the Tentative Restatement states in part: "A court should grant specific relief
before final judgment only to prevent injury that cannot be remedied by later remedies of any kind."
P. 273.
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the adequacy of a damage remedy,' seems fair. So does his observation
that courts use the rule less to second-guess plaintiffs' own best interests
than to give life to concerns that costs from an injunction might be
excessive." While Professor Laycock did not invent the notion that there
are other rules that do in fact confront problems of the cost of injunctive
remedies, his arguments for directing more of our attention toward them,
and (correspondingly) away from the irreparable injury rule, are fresh and
convincing. Perhaps the author is right in suggesting that some commenta-
tors have been too cordial to the rule.52
My point is rather that, by themselves, Professor Laycock's revela-
tions about the irreparable injury rule probably would not have made a
terribly interesting or important book. Whether seen as an attempt to slay
the rule or to announce that it is already dead, that project would have been
too narrow and contentious to offer any hope of realizing the book's
ambition: "to clarify and simplify the entire field."53  Thus, it is
fortunate that the author's case against the rule becomes something of a
sideshow by the end of the book. In a different, larger sense, Professor
Laycock makes progress toward his goal. Why not a Restatement for
remedies?' And who better than Professor Laycock to lead such a
movement?
50. Seep. 251.
51. See pp. 5-6 ("Courts may balance the costs of the equitable remedy against plaintiff's need for
it, and in that sense the degree of inadequacy may matter. But this balancing process is triggered by
variations in the cost of the equitable remedy, not by variations in the adequacy of the legal remedy.").
52. Three writers the author chided on this score were Edward Yorio, Doug Rendleman, and me.
See pp. 241-43,244 nn.9-10. It would go much too far to suggest that the three of us are of one mind.
But we all sinned, apparently, by indicating that the irreparable injury rule exists and has some general
value. In a conciliatory mood, Laycock correctly acknowledges that the difference between his
approach and ours "is largely one of characterization." P. 6. Whether the author preserves that
impression over the rest of the book is another matter.
For other responses, see Edward Yorio, A Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51 OtUO ST. LJ.
1201, 1201 n.2 (1990) (noting the forerunner of the book, Douglas Laycock, The Death of the
Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 688 (1990)); Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Irreparably
Damaged, 90 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (reviewing the book). For my part, I merely observe
that, because Laycock reads my 1983 article, supra note 5, a little differently than I do, he finds a
greater distance between our positions than I would have expected. See pp. 6, 9, 22, 25 n.7, 28 nn.21-
22, 36 n.82, 74, 85 n.13, 241,244 n.9. This is of course something of a compliment.
53. P. 7.
54. For assorted views of the function and value of the American Law Institute's Restatements,
see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 73 (1977) (suggesting that the Restatements
written in the 1920s were "the reaction of a conservative establishment, eager to preserve a threatened
status quo"); Edwin J. Owens, The Judicial Process, Stare Decisis and the Restatements, 21 CAL. ST.
BJ. 116, 126-29 (1946) (concluding that the Restatements effectively create a rebuttable legal
presumption and greater uniformity in the law); Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55
A.B.A. J. 147, 150 (1969) (arguing that Restatements should not be based solely on past judicial
decisions, but rather should incorporate all of the considerations that the courts normally weigh in
reaching their decisions).
